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Abstract
Recent literature has suggested that adopting elements of the organization of independent venture capital (VC) firms
may enhance the performance of corporate venture (CV) units (Chesbrough, 2000; Sahlman, 1990). This assertion has
only been subject to minimal empirical research: typically restricted to small-sample qualitative studies or to examining
the respective influences of independent VC firms and CV units on the performance of portfolio firms (Gompers &
Lerner, 1998; Maula & Murray, 2001).
A longitudinal survey of 95 CV units across three continents found mixed empirical support for the suggestion. Of the VC
structures and practices investigated, strongest support was found for CV unit engagement with the VC community
which was consistently associated with superior corporate venturing performance along both strategic and financial
dimensions. VC-like equity-based compensation systems were not found to influence CV performance even where CV
units were strongly focused on financial goals. Overall, the adoption of VC practices, partially mediated by venture unit
performance, was positively associated with CV unit survival. These results suggest that selective adoption of elements of
the VC model may enhance CV unit performance and survival.
Introduction
Corporate venturing is often thought to have a somewhat dubious track record in delivering benefits to parent
organizations. In contrast, independent VC firms employing limited partnership structures have become highly
prominent in the private equity market and have historically outperformed the S&P 500 index (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998;
Burgel, 2000). Accordingly, a number of theorists and practitioners have cited VC firms as a possible archetype of
“successful venturing” practice to which CV units should aspire (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Chesbrough, 2000; Sahlman,
1990). Little empirical research has examined the soundness of such advice. It is currently difficult to draw robust
conclusions about whether elements of a “VC-like” approach can influence corporate venturing performance. The
majority of relevant studies have been small sample, case-study research; larger-scale investigations (Gompers & Lerner,
1998; Maula & Murray, 2001) have only touched on these issues indirectly.
The approach taken in the present study was, first, to identify archetypal attributes of VC firms which are believed to
facilitate superior investment performance, and, second, to examine via a longitudinal survey the relationship between
these attributes and measures of CV unit performance and survival. Specifically, our study aimed to address the
following research questions:
1. Does the replication of the structures and practices of independent VC firms by CV units enhance corporate venturing
performance?
2. Does the replication of the structures and practices of VC firms by CV units increase the likelihood of CV unit survival?
3. If 1 and 2 are shown to be true, which of the identified structures and practices are associated with improved
performance and survival?
The study intends to contribute to both practice and theory on corporate venturing. Sorting “hype from reality”
regarding the VC industry (Zider, 1998: 132) and its lessons for corporate venturing is currently extremely difficult given
the lack of relevant empirical research. Despite recent declines, corporate venturing tends to mirrors the wider
macro-economy by following a strongly cyclical path (Chesbrough, 2000; Coveney, Elton, Shah, & Whitehead, 2002;
Sohl, 2002). It is highly probable that we will again experience a new “wave” of venturing necessitating grounded
guidance to CV managers. The study contributes to theory by advancing scholarly understanding of organizational and
managerial factors that influence CV unit performance and survival -- areas suffering from a lack of systematic,
large-scale and/or longitudinal research. In particular, the study addresses the issue of the transferability of the VC
governance and value-adding mechanisms to venturing units within large, established firms.
Background to Venture Capital and Corporate Venturing
CV units are separately managed entities established by large firms with the purpose of investing in and developing new
business opportunities (Birkinshaw, 1997; Block & MacMillan, 1993). Such units may engage in a variety of speculative
forms of non-core investment “from making small investments in independent start-ups, to incubating internal business
ideas, to spinning out businesses” (Birkinshaw, Batenburg, & Murray, 2002: 9). The objectives of corporate venture units
typically include both strategic and financial dimensions (Chesbrough, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Siegel, Siegel, &
MacMillan, 1988).
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The organizational form of VC firms has received a great deal of attention, primarily in financial economics literature
(Sahlman, 1990; Barry, 1994; Gompers & Lerner, 1999). The dominant organizational form in the organized private
equity market is the limited liability partnership (LLP) which is adopted by the great majority of independent VC firms
(Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1995). Hellmann (2000) described venture capital as “professionally managed, equity-like
financing of young, growth-oriented private companies”. In essence, VCs are structured as fixed term partnerships
wherein institutional investors are limited partners (LPs) and professional private equity managers are the general
partners (GPs). The structure provides substantial autonomy to the GPs over investment decisions (Fenn et. al., 1995).
The agency costs that this arrangement may otherwise create is attenuated by strict contracting, the finite lifespan of the
fund, and substantial equity-based incentives to the GPs (Fenn et. al., 1995).
The exceptional returns generated by VC firms over the past two decades (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Chesbrough, 2000;
Donahoe, Schefter, & Harding, 2001) have resulted in much interest in distilling “best practice” from these firms and
applying it to corporate venturing. Particularly, the dearth of large-scale and/or longitudinal research on determinants
of CV unit performance (for earlier studies refer to Fast, 1978; Rind, 1981; Sykes, 1990; Siegel et al., 1988), together with
the widespread reputation of corporate venturing as being very challenging and with variable and uncertain benefits,
have created fertile ground for the prescription of VC structures and practices to corporate venturing contexts. Yet, this
pragmatic and wide scale prescription has little empirical validation.
Theory and Hypotheses
The fundamental proposition of VC-model advocates is that the greater the extent to which a corporate venturing unit
adopts the structures and practices of the “typical” (LLP) VC firm, the better its performance will be relative to that of
other CV units. To make testing this proposition tractable, three key elements of the VC model were identified from VC
literature. These were: (1) substantial autonomy over investment decisions (2) the use of high-powered equity-based
incentives, and (3) the practices of networking within the VC community and syndicating investment opportunities
(Chesbrough, 2000; Donahoe et al., 2001; Fenn et al., 1995; Lerner, 1994; Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2003; Zider, 1998).
The influence of each attribute on CV unit performance will be hypothesized in turn before exploring their combined
influence on venture survival.
It is important to recognise at the outset that “blind” replication of the VC model is unlikely to be successful. Corporate
venture units are different from VCs by definition in that they are created and controlled by a large firm. As such, they
have certain obligations (e.g. investing in areas that are of strategic value to the firm) and constraints on their activities
(e.g. rewarding employees on the firm’s traditional pay scale) that independent VCs are not subject to. Furthermore, CV
units vary significantly on a number of dimensions, most notably their objectives and their internal organizational
arrangements. Here we examine CV units in terms of their common features, theorising contingent relationships where
generic characteristics represent a major source of internal variation. The resulting hypotheses are shown graphically in
Figure 1.
Adoption of VC Model and Unit Performance
Governance system providing substantial autonomy. As noted, the VC firms’ GPs are free to invest the funds under
their control without involvement or sanction by the LPs. Consequently, they can respond quickly to investment
opportunities (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998). The application of VC governance systems to CV units would imply that such
units are authorised to act independently on day-to-day investment decisions, with high autonomy from both corporate
head offices “vertical” autonomy) and from other operating divisions (“horizontal” autonomy).
The issue of how much separation a venture unit should have from its parent company has been well recognized (see
Drucker, 1985; Galbraith, 1982; Burgelman, 1984). In extremis, venture capitalists have full autonomy from their
investors over and beyond the ten-year investment horizon. Operational autonomy gives CV managers the freedom to
decide on the appropriate level of integration for each venture (taking into account issues such as the strategic
relatedness of the investment). This structure also provides a mechanism for venture unit managers to manage the
oft-quoted conflict of interests between themselves and their corporate parent, e.g. over the time horizon of investments.
Hypothesis 1: The greater the autonomy of a CV unit over investment decisions, the higher the performance of the unit.
Hypothesis 2: The lesser the involvement of parent company business units in CV unit decision-making, the higher the
performance of the unit.
Carried interest compensation providing high-powered incentives. GPs are rewarded primarily through a carried
interest in the equity of the VC fund’s portfolio firms. The carry is typically 20% and may be conditional on a minimum
investment performance (the “hurdle”). These incentives may perform a number of important functions for VC firms,
including: (1) mitigating principal-agent conflict through incentive alignment, (2) introducing clarity of focus and
discipline to VC activities, and (3) attracting highly skilled investment professionals (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Fenn et al.,
1995; Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Sahlman, 1990).
CV units have typically applied standard corporate reward systems to their venture professionals. It is indeed
questionable whether VC-like incentive systems can be satisfactorily applied to CV units (Block & Ornati, 1987; Block &
MacMillan, 1993; Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Gompers & Lerner, 1998). Frequent changes in staffing responsibilities may
create difficulties in attributing performance to the CV team; nor are managers investing or risking any of their own
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create difficulties in attributing performance to the CV team; nor are managers investing or risking any of their own
money. Individuals who engage in corporate entrepreneurship may weight differently from venture capitalists security of
employment versus the possibility of exceptional financial returns (Rumelt, 1987). Additionally, CV managers are
typically recruited as career professionals. The CV posting may be one of many offices held in their corporate careers,
whilst partners of VC firms usually make permanent commitments to their firms.
Critically, focusing on financial return may also encourage moral hazard by reducing managers’ attention paid to the
strategic value of investments. Compensation in the form of carried interest may only deliver the benefits of incentive
alignment and focus in cases where the goals of the venture unit are predominantly financial. Stated more formally, we
expect that the relationship between CV unit adoption of carried interest compensation systems and venture unit
performance would be moderated by the unit’s emphasis on financial goals:
Hypothesis 3: The greater the focus on financial goals in the CV unit, the greater the impact of equity-based
compensation on the performance of the unit.
Engagement with the VC community. The practice of syndicating investment opportunities between members of the VC
community serves a number of functions. It allows VCs to reduce informational asymmetries by pooling judgements
from multiple sources of expertise (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Lerner, 1994). The expectation of reciprocal syndication
allows VC community members to be exposed to more investment opportunities (“deal flow”) than would otherwise be
the case. Syndication also enables risk sharing (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Wright & Lockett, 2002).
Frequent communication with VCs may provide CV units with similar benefits to deal syndication, including
opportunities to acquire more tacit knowledge regarding VC investment practices and mental models. An association
with VCs may also confer greater legitimacy to CV units, allowing them access to enhanced deal flow and skilled staff.
Recent studies have confirmed that so-called “corporate venture capital” activities (i.e. external corporate venturing) can
significantly improve the ability of parent companies to engage in exploratory learning and the recognition of
technological opportunities (Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2002). While certain of these benefits would appeal to both
internally- and externally-oriented CV units, enhanced access to syndicated deal flow and risk sharing are likely to be
particularly relevant to externally focused units. Formally stated:
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the level of engagement in the VC community by the CV unit, the higher the performance of
the unit.
Hypothesis 4b: The greater the importance of external business ideas to the CV unit, the greater the impact of
engagement in the VC community on performance of the unit.
Hypothesis 5a: The more frequently a CV unit engages in deal syndication with external partners, the higher the
performance of the unit.
Hypothesis 5b: The greater the importance of external business ideas to the CV unit, the greater the impact of deal
syndication on performance of the unit.
Adoption of VC Model, Unit Performance and Survival
It is established practice within evolutionary paradigms to investigate the survival rates of “species” of organizational
forms. High survival rates of a particular form typically are interpreted to indicate the “fitness” of that form (and vice
versa). In the private equity market, the LLP has progressively become the dominant organisation form over the last two
decades (Fenn et al., 1995), thereby demonstrating its fitness in its landscape. In contrast, we know little about the
factors influencing the longevity of CV units. Fast’s (1978) research is an exception in finding that changed political will
in the parent company frequently resulted in venture unit closure. One can therefore hypothesise that, if the VC form is
relevant, CV firms adopting this model would have greater survival rates reflecting the superior performance (“fitness”)
of this form. Accordingly, it is proposed that:
Hypothesis 6: Venture unit performance mediates the relationship between the adoption of elements of the VC model by
a CV unit, and unit survival.
Methodology
Sample and Research Design
The research consisted of three main phases. The first phase, mid-2001, comprised exploratory interviews with 50
individuals in 40 corporate venturing units across eight countries. These interviews were used to understand current
practices regarding corporate venturing.
The second research phase (early- to mid-2002) involved surveying managers of CV units. The sampling frame
comprised CV units listed in the Corporate Venturing Directory or in Venture Economics, along with additional venture
units known to the researchers. These sources yielded 447 potential respondents to whom mail surveys were distributed.
Follow-up calls found 120 of the venturing units to be inactive. Useable responses were received from 95 units: an
eventual response rate of 29%. Secondary data from Venture Economics—available for 71 CV units—was used to validate
survey responses regarding the investment history of the units and to confirm the validity of performance proxies.1
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ANOVAs and cross-tabs did not find any significant response biases by age of unit, monetary budget, average annual
number of investments, number of employees or unit preference for 17 types of funding (e.g. start-up funding, first-stage
funding, etc.).2 Significant differences were only found for the headquarter location of CV units (c2 = 39.563, p = .000)
and their relative preference for seed funding (c2 = 6.695, p = .010). Overall, these analyses suggested that respondents
were largely representative of units in the sampling frame.
The third phase (May-July 2003), 18 months after the mail survey, entailed a telephonic survey to managers from the
participating CV units. Respondents were asked whether or not their CV unit was still active.3 If appropriate,
respondents were asked to recall the month and year in which it had ceased operations. We were able to speak with a
person from 81 of the original 95 CV units (85% of the sample). Eighteen units (23%) were found to have closed down
subsequent to the survey, while the remaining 63 (77%) were still active in one form or another. Web data was used to
confirm the status of the remaining units.
Dependent Variables
The majority of the measures (dependent, independent and control measures) are derived from the mail survey. As no
other studies (to the best of our knowledge) have examined the replication of VC structures and practices in CV contexts,
the measures were developed by the researchers, drawing on prior literature where possible, as well as constructs
emerging from the exploratory interviews. All multi-item scales were found (via orthogonal rotated factor analyses) to be
uni-dimensional, and to demonstrate moderate to excellent internal consistency. Multi-item constructs (including
Cronbach alphas) are detailed in Table 1.
As venture units are typically reluctant to provide “hard” data on the performance of their investments, and quantifying
the strategic performance of ventures in large companies can present extreme challenges, CV managers’ were asked for
subjective perceptions of the performance of their units over the previous 3 years. The longitudinal data on CV unit
survival supplemented these self-reported, cross-sectional measures.
Strategic value examined the perceived strategic value delivered by the unit including the creation of “options” on new
technologies (Chesbrough, 2000, 2002; Maula et al., 2002), and wider awareness of the company’s CV activities
internally and externally.
Financial performance measured perceptions of how well the unit had delivered on three key financial objectives
identified within the exploratory interviews.
Survival status recorded whether CV representatives classified their units as “active” or “inactive” in the telephone
survey.
Independent Variables
Autonomy assessed the extent to which CV managers (compared to parent company executives) were responsible for
making 10 types of investment decisions. Higher scores indicate the greater investment autonomy of CV unit managers.
Business unit decision involvement examined how extensively other business units within the parent company were
involved in CV unit decision-making.
Carried interest asked CV managers how frequently carried interest was employed to incentivize venture unit staff (to
examine the replication of the high-powered VC incentives).
Financial emphasis sought to differentiate those units that focus little from those that focus primarily on financial
objectives.
VC communication assessed the extent to which a CV unit maintained links with the VC sector, measured by frequency
of communication.
Deal syndication examined whether a CV unit regularly engaged in deal syndication with VC firms.
Control Variables
Age of unit (in years) acted as a proxy for the impact of learning and experience effects on venture unit performance.
Additionally, age was controlled to isolate history effects whereby more recently established units may be more likely to
adopt elements of the VC model.
Region comprised a dummy variable to distinguish between US and non US-based venture units.
Number of investments controlled for possible “economies of scale” effects on performance. It may also tap a “learning
curve” effect on performance.
Internal orientation controlled for the relative emphasis placed by a unit on internally-generated investments in case
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Internal orientation controlled for the relative emphasis placed by a unit on internally-generated investments in case
this factor exerted a main effect on venture unit performance.
Data Analysis
Ordinary least squares regression and logistic regression were used to test the hypotheses. To reduce the potential
impact of multicollinearity, all non-categorical independent and control variables were centred. VIF indices for the
regression analyses were all below 3.00 (recommended threshold for variance inflation), indicating that
multicollinearity was not of significant concern in the analyses. Furthermore, residual plots indicated that the use of
OLS regression was appropriate given the error distributions of the predictor variables.
The threat posed by common method variance within the mail survey was investigated by subjecting the data to a
Harman one-factor test. This test indicated that common method bias did not pose a significant threat to the survey
data-a conclusion also borne out by the somewhat different pattern of findings of regression models for the strategic and
financial performance measures.
Results
The first set of hypotheses (H1 to H5) specifies direct and moderated relationships between the adoption of VC
structures and practices, and venture unit performance. Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the OLS regression of
strategic value on the independent and control variables and financial performance regressed on the same variables,
respectively.
Hypothesis 1 posited a positive relationship between autonomy and venture unit performance. This hypothesis receives
strong support in the financial performance model (b = .385, p = .030 in the full model), but the relationship between
the variables does not attain significance in the strategic value model.4 Hypothesis 1 is thus partially supported.
Hypothesis 2 posited a negative relationship between business unit involvement in the decisions of the venture unit and
unit performance. As predicted, business unit involvement in decision-making was significantly, and negatively,
associated with strategic performance (b = -.104, p = .007 in the full model). Business unit involvement was not,
however, found to be significantly associated with financial performance. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is partially supported.
Hypothesis 3 posited a moderated relationship between the use of carried interest compensation, the emphasis of the
venture unit on financial goals, and venture unit performance: venture unit performance would be enhanced where a
unit with strong financial goals adopted a carried interest compensation system. Neither the strategic value model nor
the financial performance model found support for this proposition, which is consequently rejected.5
Hypotheses 4 and 5 posited direct and moderated relationships between, respectively, communication with VCs and deal
syndication, and venture unit performance. Specifically, hypothesis 4a stated that extensive communication with VCs
would be associated with enhanced venture unit performance. Hypothesis 4b posited that this association would be
particularly strong where a VC unit focused primarily on internal ventures. Strong support was found for Hypothesis 4:
communication with VCs was positively associated with strategic value (b = .232, p = .001 in model 5) and with financial
performance (b = .203, p = .042 in model 5). Partial support was received for hypothesis 4b: the interaction term
between VC communication and internal orientation was significant in the financial performance model (b = -.160, p =
.096 in the full model), but not in the strategic value model. Hypotheses 5a found support in the strategic value model (b
= .182, p = .017 in model 6), but not the financial performance model. Hypothesis 5b was not supported for either unit
outcome.
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), a series of regression analyses were performed to test for mediation (by VC unit
performance) between adoption of the VC model and venture unit survival (posited in Hypothesis 6). Using a combined
measure where strategic and financial performance scales are equally weighted, overall unit performance partially
mediated between adoption of the efficacious elements of the VC model and unit survival. This is the case for unit
strategic performance too, but not the model where only financial performance is measured (tables available from
authors). Accordingly, Hypothesis 6 finds moderate support overall.
Discussion and Implications
As noted, this present research is one of the most extensive, contemporary empirical studies undertaken in the field of
corporate venturing. The use of a multiple stage enquiry and the involvement of nearly 100 CV organisations across 3
continents to retrieve data both in direct discussion and via postal questionnaire distinguish the scale of this enquiry.
The findings of the research challenge simplistic interpretations. While there are a number of elements of the dominant
venture capital firm/LLP model which have clear relevance for corporate investors, our findings indicate that
recommendations need to be strongly qualified and placed in a clearly specified context.
Only two elements of the VC model were found to have consistent effects across both the strategic value and financial
performance models. Carried interest was demonstrated to be uniformly ineffective for both strategic and
financially-oriented CV units. Also, increased contact with VC firms appears to be desirable across all types of CV unit,
albeit to a lesser extent within the financial model. Generally, prescriptions cannot be made without reference to the
objectives of the CV unit itself. Particularly, the objective of the corporate venture unit’s investment activity strongly
differentiates between structures and practices which may, or may not, be effective. For example, business unit
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differentiates between structures and practices which may, or may not, be effective. For example, business unit
involvement in decision making has significant, negative implications when the CV unit seeks to contribute to strategic
value. Essentially, if a firm wishes its corporate venturing arm to add value to overall strategic effectiveness, it is
incumbent on the head office to ensure that the actions of the CV unit are not confounded by an interfering business
unit. Yet, if the goal of the corporation is to use the CV unit for a primarily financial contribution, the involvement of the
business unit ceases to be significant. Additionally, the research supports the assertions that CV units need autonomy
from the parent organisation. However, this finding is qualified as autonomy does not serve to improve the strategic
value model, merely the financial performance model.
Determining the core purpose of the CV unit and quantifying the relative importance of financial or strategic goals is an
endemic problem for researchers. Yet, it is difficult to give these two alternative modus operandi equal status. The
likelihood of most CV units being of a scale that can directly influence the financial results of the parent organisation is
small. Given the portfolio of core activities of the parent organisation, the financial contribution of the CV unit is likely
to remain modest. However, the potential for strategic value is potentially far greater. Indeed, our analysis of the
mediating role venture unit performance plays between adoption of elements of the VC model and venture unit survival,
indicates that strategic logic is a more important mediator (than financial performance) on both CV unit performance
and survival. Put another way, strategic performance is more salient than financial performance in the parent’s decision
to either support or to terminate a CV activity. In its strategic role, the CV unit provides market intelligence and
environmental scanning in order to identify new product/market opportunities (and threats). The persistence of
strategic CV activity amongst technology-based firms may indeed be explained by its efficacy in the early identification
and exploitation of novel and disruptive technologies-an outcome that is likely to have widespread value to the parent.
Inevitably our research poses as many questions as answers. For example, we can say little as to the underlying
mechanisms through which engagement with VC firms benefits CV units, or why autonomy plays such a critical role to
venture unit financial performance. We too have little to say yet on how CV units can practicably balance strategic and
financial objectives. Difficulties of access to information and the consequent ambiguities of available metrics also
continue to make CV research extremely challenging. Nonetheless, we can start to advise corporations on the value of
specific components of the dominant VC model. Ironically, we can confirm the spirit of what CV units and corporate
head offices already know. Successful corporate venturing, regardless of objectives, is a uniquely challenging managerial
activity.
CONTACT: Susan Hill, London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom; (T)
+44 78 1201 6451; (F) +44 20 7724 7875; shill@london.edu
Notes
1. Venture Economics investment data has been used extensively to proxy private equity returns (Gompers & Lerner,
1998; Maula & Murray, 2001). The self-reported portfolio data was highly consistent with Venture Economics data (p =
.000).
2. The tests for non-response bias found that the proportion of European respondents was somewhat higher than
expected, whilst fewer than expected responses were received from North American CV units; the proportion of
respondents who expressed a preference for seed funding was higher than that amongst non-respondents.
3. The process followed to establish the survival status of venture units allowed for a degree of respondent discretion,
both in deciding whether the unit was still “operating” and in recalling, where applicable, the month and year of closure.
Overall, we judged the importance of obtaining a high response rate through brief telephone interviews to outweigh the
risk of obtaining data with a degree of imprecision. As a precaution, the interviewer recorded any mixed perceptions of
the unit status as fully as possible, and the researchers jointly classified such units.
4. As prominent scholars have conflicting views over the role of autonomy in venture unit performance, models using a
squared term for autonomy were also run to investigate the possibility of a curvilinear relationship. In no instances did
the squared term achieve significance.
5. A number of variants on the carried interest measure were also tested. For example, one alternative tested was CV
usage of either carried interest systems, equity-based systems, or “direct financial incentives”; another used the
incidence of flat-rate salaries (reverse-scored). Findings were consistent with those reported here.
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